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1. Introduction
The tradability of services undoubtedly took o⁄ in the 1980s due to technological im-
provements, particularly in information, telecommunications and transportation. Services
represent around 20% of global trade (Bensidoun and ￿nal-Kesenci, 2008). At the same
time as its increasing importance in international trade, services have become the focus of
attention in the context of multilateral and bilateral/plurilateral negotiations since the end of
the 1990s.1 Di⁄erent types of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) exist. Some like Preferen-
tial Trade Agreement (PTA), Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and Custom Union (CU) cover
goods; while an Economic Integration Agreement (EIA) covers services.2 Some countries
had launched into negotiations on services earlier than others, particularly when a bilateral
or plurilateral trade agreement on goods was already in force. Most of the well-established
trade agreements such as Nafta, Anzcerta and the European Union introduced services in
the 1990s.
In the literature, there is no consensus on the e⁄ect of RTAs on trade ￿ ows. Some studies
conclude that trade agreements have no impact on intra-members trade (see Bergstrand
(1985); Frankel et al. (1995)), or some fragile e⁄ects (see Gosh and Yamarik (2004)). Urata
and Okabe (2007) observe a weak impact of the di⁄erent FTAs overtime. In contrast to
these non-signi￿cant results, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) ￿nd a positive impact of FTAs on
trade. Countries that sign a trade agreement are already good trading partners. Thus, a
further liberalization can only lead to a large trade creation amongst these countries. Besides,
they note that the speci￿cation of the gravity equation commonly used under-estimates the
RTA coe¢ cient: roughly by 75% with OLS (see Tre￿ er, 1993). To handle the endogeneity
problem, several methodologies have been proposed by the literature (see Section 2). Using
panel data with bilateral-pair ￿xed e⁄ects and accounting for multilateral resistance terms,
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) conclude that FTAs increase trade by 58% on average, and by
86% after ￿fteen years. Similarly, Baier et al. (2008) carry out an ex-post analysis on the
role of EIAs on trade; and ￿nd large and positive impacts of EIAs on the intra-signatories
trade.3 Carrere (2006).￿nd evidence of trade diversion and trade creation for seven RTAs.
Concerning the e⁄ect of speci￿c RTAs, Frankel (1997) highlights the positive and signif-
icant impact of Mercosur on intra-members trade. The economic impacts of the European
Union have been widely investigated also.4 Baier et al. (2008) estimate a gravity equation
introducing di⁄erent dummies to assess the role of di⁄erent RTAs: the European Union
(EU), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the European Economic Area (EEA)
1The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),created in 1995, is the ￿rst multilateral set of rules
to liberalize international trade in services amongst WTO members.
2Note that the Economic Integration Agreement is generally a part (one or several chapters) of the whole
legal text.
3The literature also treats questions related to anticipation e⁄ect, trade diversion, currency unions im-
pacts; depth of RTAs and phase-in issues. See Glick and Rose (2002); Frankel and Rose (2002); Baier et al.
(2008); Vicard (2009) among others.
4See Aitken (1973), and Brada and Mendez (1985) for previous studies.
686Economics Bulletin, 2012, Vol. 32 No. 1 pp. 685-697
and all other EIAs (OEIA). On average, the trade e⁄ects are relatively similar in terms of
magnitude across trade agreements. The impacts of the European Treaty on intra-members
trade are lower using cross-sectional analyses (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1997) compared
to panel analyses (Baier et al. 2008).
Turning to services, few studies examine the role of RTAs on trade in services. Estimat-
ing a gravity equation on trade in services between 1999 and 2000, Ceglowski (2006) ￿nds
evidence of a positive relationship between RTAs (CEFTA; EEA; EFTA; EU; NAFTA) and
trade in services; and also between trade in goods and trade in services. Marchetti (2009)
includes country-and-time ￿xed e⁄ects and ￿nds a similar impact of PTAs and European
Union membership on trade in services. Nevertheless, Guillin (2011) highlights that only
deep EIAs have a positive and signi￿cant impact on trade in services.5
Most of the papers relating RTAs and services consider di⁄erent kinds of RTAs without
clearly distinguishing amongst RTAs except in Ceglowski (2006). Nevertheless, Baier et al.
(2008) show that the e⁄ects of trade agreements on trade in goods can di⁄er across trade
agreements. The aim of this paper is to examine the distinct economic impacts of prominent
RTAs in force in the European continent on trade in services using a longer time horizon
and considering trade creation/trade diversion issues. Because most European countries are
related to each other by a RTA that covers services, it is interesting to investigate the pattern
of trade in services in Europe.
My ￿ndings highlight that the main RTAs in force in Europe do not have a similar impact
on trade in services. Moreover, countries belonging to the same RTA do not experience
analogous e⁄ects of the RTA in their intra-bloc and extra-bloc trade.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I describe the empirical strategy
and the data. Section 3 presents the results and Section 4 concludes.
2. Empirical strategy
2.1. Gravity equation
In Tinbergen (1962), gravity allows us to explain bilateral trade by the size of each part-
ner (GDP is generally the proxy used for the economic size) and inversely by the distance.
More explanatory variables, like contiguity, common language, common history but also
trade agreements, have been introduced over time as determinants of bilateral trade. An-
derson and van Wincoop (2003) and Feenstra (2004) highlight the importance to account
for prices through multilateral resistance terms (MRT); otherwise estimates will su⁄er from
omitted variable bias. Countries can select into trade agreements for non-observable rea-
sons, generating a source of correlation between the error term ￿ij and RTAij. Because of
this self-selection issue and endogeneity bias, analyses in cross-section lead to inconsistent
coe¢ cients (see Baier and Bergstrand (2007); Baier et al. (2008)).
According to Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Baldwin and Taglioni (2006), MRTs
in the case of panel data have to be time-varying and can be taken into consideration using
country-and-time ￿xed e⁄ects. Thus, the literature recommends analyzing the impacts of
5See Adlung and Roy (2005) and Egger and Lanz (2008) for studies on the GATS coverage.
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RTAs on trade by considering panel data with country-and-time and bilateral ￿xed e⁄ects or
by ￿rst di⁄erencing data. Moreover, Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) suggest the use of nominal
trade and nominal GDPs instead of real trade and GDPs to avoid the conversion factors
between US dollars in di⁄erent years.
The following equation is estimated using panel data with bilateral and country-and-time
￿xed e⁄ects:
lnXijt = ￿0 + ￿1 ln(GDPit) + ￿2 ln(GDPjt) + ￿3 ln(Distij) + ￿4(Langij) (1)





where Xijt is the non-null nominal bilateral trade in services between country i and country
j at year t. The explanatory variables in Equation 1 are: GDP of exporting country i and
of importing country j; Distij, the geographic distance between both partners; Langij, the
common language dummy; Borderij, the contiguity dummy; RTAijt, a dummy to account
for common regional trade agreement; Pit and Pjt the MRTs of country i and j are accounted
for in introducing country-and-time ￿xed e⁄ects as the literature suggests. Nevetheless, by
including country-and-time ￿xed e⁄ects, the e⁄ects of GDPs will be captured. Similarly,
using bilateral ￿xed e⁄ects, all the time-invariant bilateral variables, like Distij, Langij and
Borderij, will be captured. In a panel with country-and-time and bilateral ￿xed e⁄ects, the
remaining bilateral and time-variant explanatory variable is RTAijt. Note that in control-
ling for bilateral and country-and-time characteristics, the estimated coe¢ cient ￿6 can be
interpreted as the direct e⁄ect of bilateral trade agreement on bilateral trade in services.
The impact of RTAijt in year t is evaluated using the following formula: (e￿6 ￿ 1) ￿ 100.
Using ￿rst di⁄erenced panel, Equation 1 can be rewritten as follows:
dlnXij;t = ￿6dRTAij;t + ￿i;t￿(t￿1)Dummyi;t￿(t￿1) + (2)
￿j;t￿(t￿1)Dummyj;t￿(t￿1) + (￿ijt ￿ ￿ij;t￿1)
wherein the white noise is the di⁄erence between ￿ijt and ￿ij;t￿1. Dummyi;t￿(t￿1) repre-
sents the lagged MRT for the exporting country i, and Dummyj;t￿(t￿1) for the importing





jt . dlnXij;t is the ￿rst di⁄erenced natural logarithm of the nominal bilateral
trade between i and j, obtained from lnXijt ￿lnXij;t￿1. Similarly, dRTAij;t is the di⁄erence
between RTAijt and RTAij;t￿1. Note that time-invariant bilateral ￿xed e⁄ects cancel out in
the case of ￿rst di⁄erenced panel.
Wooldridge (2002) points out that "In many cases, truth is likely to lie somewhere in be-
tween.", because the ￿rst di⁄erence estimator is more e¢ cient than the ￿xed e⁄ects estimate
if the error term follows a random walk, while the ￿xed e⁄ects estimator is more e¢ cient
when the error term is not serially correlated when the number of periods is greater than
two. Consequently, results using panel data with country-and-time and bilateral ￿xed e⁄ects
and ￿rst di⁄erenced panel with country-and-time ￿xed e⁄ects are reported.
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2.2. Trade creation and trade diversion
Trade is created if trade between signatories of a common agreement increases while
trade is diverted if signatories favor preferential partners over the rest of the world. Trade
diversion is generally examined by including more dummies in the speci￿cations. Carrere
(2006) considers trade diversion by introducing dummies to capture the changes in imports
from the rest of the world and in exports to the rest of the world. To analyze intra-bloc
trade (trade creation), a binary variable is equal to one if both countries are involved in a
common agreement; while to analyze trade diversion, RTA
exp
ijt is equal to one if the exporter
belongs to a RTA but the importer belongs to the rest of the world and RTA
imp
ijt is equal
to one if the importer belongs to a RTA but the exporter belongs to the rest of the world.
Nevertheless, country-and-time ￿xed e⁄ects capture the changes in total imports and exports
of a given country in panel. Thus, trade diversion and trade creation e⁄ects cannot be direclty
estimated by including dummy variables. Magee (2008) proposes to compare actual and
predicted trade within and outside the blocs. Trade creation is computed as the di⁄erence
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The dependent variable is nominal bilateral trade in total services. I use Eurostat data
combined with OECD data on trade in total services for the period 1999-2008. Data are
available for 37 exporters with their 165 commercial partners. Due to problems of memory
caused by the large number of dummies that I have to create to deal with country-and-time
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and bilateral ￿xed e⁄ects, I construct a panel for every two years from the period 1999-2008.
I present the results for the panel 1999-2001-2003-2005-2007.
I use information provided by the Regional Trade Agreement database provided by the
World Trade Organization (WTO) on the date of entry into force, the signatories and the ac-
cessions.6 The signatories of RTAs considered are displayed in Table 1. The di⁄erent dummy
variables are equal to one if both countries i and j are involved in a given trade agreement
at time t; and zero otherwise. Thus, three dummies are generated: ECijt; EFTAijt and
EEAijt.
I use Cepii data on distance between capital cities in kilometers, common language and
common border as well; and Penn World Tables for GDPs.
3. Results
In Table 2 column (1), the explanatory variables commonly used in gravity estimations
perform well in the case of trade in services. Indeed, trade in services depends positively on
economic sizes of both countries. Bilateral characteristics such as common border and sharing
a common language increase signi￿cantly bilateral trade, while distance a⁄ects negatively
the bilateral trade in services. Concerning RTAs, only European Union and EEA have a
large, positive and signi￿cant impact on intra-bloc trade. In including time and bilateral
￿xed e⁄ects, the coe¢ cients decrease. In column (3), I account for endogeneity issues by
including bilateral and country-and-time ￿xed e⁄ects. Intra-members trade is increased by
35% due to the European Treaty, while EEA enhances trade in services by 44%. Similarly
to column (1), the impact of EFTA on trade is not signi￿cant. The EFTA signatories that
are involved in the European Economic Area are more likely to trade services with European
partners than to trade with EFTA partners over the period considered. According to the
Wald test in column (4), both ECijt and EEAijt coe¢ cients are equal indicating both trade
agreements have analogous impacts on bilateral trade in services. One of the two RTAs is
not more trade creating than the other.
Using ￿rst di⁄erenced panel, only the e⁄ects of changes over the period considered are
captured; while the estimations based on panel data with country-and-time and bilateral
￿xed e⁄ects permit to capture the average impact of a given agreement over the period
considered. For example, Belgium and Germany are under European Treaty for the whole
period, as both countries are original signatories. Because no change is recorded in this
case, the lagged variable dECij;t￿(t￿1), corresponding to ECijt ￿ ECij;t￿1, is 0 for the whole
sample. In di⁄erence in di⁄erences, column (4) shows that for the new entrants in the
European Union, the intra-trade is negative indicating that trade creation does not occur
between these commercial partners. One explanation consists in the phased-in feature of
RTAs. Indeed, including the year of entry into force only may be not su¢ cient to capture
the full economic impact (see Baier et al. (2008)). However, the countries that joined
Europe during enlargement waves trade substantially with EEA members: the coe¢ cient
dEEAij;t￿(t￿1) is largely positive and signi￿cant.
6See http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx.
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Turning to trade diversion issue in Table 3, EEA and European Union induce positive
intra-trade while the impact of EFTA on intra-trade in services is negative. According to
column (2), EEA is associated with an inclination to export to the rest of the world but also
to import from the rest of the world. On average, the impacts of European Treaty on trade
in services are contained in trade creation more than trade diversion. Interestingly, EFTA
members have a positive propensity to trade with European countries, but to import from
the rest of the world as well. Nevertheless, one can observe a trade diversion from the export
side as the obtained coe¢ cient for EFTAexporter is negative and signi￿cant.
Table 4 shows the estimated measurements of trade e⁄ects of EFTA, EEA and EU for the
year 2005 on the ten countries that entered the European Union in 2004, based on Equations
3 and 4. As a general result, the trade impacts of EEA and European Treaty are not
homogenous within a given trade agreement across new entrants. On average, the increase
in imports from the countries belonging to the same trade agreement is more important
in case of EU compare to EEA. This result con￿rms the results found in Table 3. The
average trade diversion induced by EU is 0% for Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland and Slovak Republic. Imports to Malta, Latvia and Lithuania from EU
countries increase less compare to other new entrants. Poland seems to have weak gains from
both trade agreements. Table 4 highlights the importance of distinguishing across members
to analyze the impacts of RTAs on intra-bloc and extra-bloc trade. In addition, I ￿nd results
in line with Magee (2008) that analyzes the impacts of di⁄erent RTAs on trade in goods.
The overall e⁄ects of the three RTAs considered show that trade creation prevails over trade
diversion, at least for the year 2005. Although the e⁄ects of a given RTA can be null for a
given signatory, this is o⁄set by the aggregate e⁄ects of this RTA.
4. Concluding remarks
As a conclusion, I ￿nd that the main RTAs in force in Europe do not have a similar
impact on trade in services. Indeed, European Union and European Economic Area are
trade creating while European Free Trade Association does not have a signi￿cant impact
on intra-members trade. Moreover, in examining trade creation and trade diversion more
speci￿cally, the results point out the importance to di⁄erentiate trading partners as the trade
impacts vary signi￿cantly across countries.
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Table 1: Regional Trade Agreements considered in the analysis
RTA name Date of entry Current signatories
into force
European Economic Area 1994 Austria*; Belgium; Bulgaria*; Cyprus*; Czech Republic*; Denmark;
Estonia*; Finland*; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary*; Iceland; Ireland;
Italy; Latvia*; Liechtenstein; Lithuania*; Luxembourg; Malta*;Netherlands;
Norway; Poland*; Portugal; Romania*; Slovak Republic*; Slovenia*; Spain;
Sweden*; United Kingdom.
European Union 1995 Austria*; Belgium; Bulgaria*; Cyprus*; Czech Republic*; Denmark;
Estonia*; Finland*; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary*; Ireland; Italy;
Latvia*; Lithuania*; Luxembourg; Malta*; Netherlands; Poland*; Portugal;
Romania*; Slovak Republic*; Slovenia*; Spain; Sweden*; United Kingdom.
European Free Trade Association 2002 Iceland; Liechtenstein; Norway; Switzerland.
* indicates that this country is a current member but not an original signatory.
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Table 2: Determinants of trade in services: role played by RTAs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDPit (exporter) 0.851a(0.01) 1.021a(0.10)




ECijt 0.691a(0.03) 0.368a(0.04) 0.302a(0.04)
EEAijt 0.650a(0.11) 0.178 (0.14) 0.368a(0.10)









Within R2 0.421 0.445 0.123






Dependent variable is the log of total bilateral trade in services Value of standard-errors in parentheses;
a signi￿cant at 1%; b signi￿cant at 5%; c signi￿cant at 10%. Wald tests : Null hypothesis of equality
of coe¢ cients is rejected at 1% (a); 5% (b) and 10% (c). The time, bilateral and country-and-time dummy
variables and the constant are not reported for brevity.
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Table 3: Trade diversion/trade creation
(1) (2)
GDPit (exporter) 0.775a(0.01) 0.952a(0.11)





ECexporter 0.103b(0.04) 0.057 (0.07)
ECimporter 0.150a(0.05) 0.032 (0.08)




EFTAexporter 0.077 (0.08) -0.236b(0.09)
EFTAimporter 0.503a(0.06) 0.142c(0.08)
Within R2 0.424 0.449




Dependent variable is the log of total bilateral trade in services Value of standard-errors in parentheses;
a signi￿cant at 1%; b signi￿cant at 5%; c signi￿cant at 10%. The time, bilateral and country-and-time
dummy variables and the constant are not reported for brevity.
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Table 4: Trade diversion/trade creation measurements for the new entrants (EC25) in 2005
Importing countries Partner Intra-bloc trade Extra-bloc trade
(in million) (in million)
European Union
Cyprus EU 3090 1310
Czech Republic EU 3500 -3210
Estonia EU 1120 -82
Hungary EU 4390 -629
Malta EU 647 62
Latvia EU 769 -164
Lithuania EU 657 -558
Poland EU -60 -9980
Slovenia EU 1420 371
Slovak Republic EU 2340 -1260
European Economic Area
Cyprus EEA 44 4360
Czech Republic EEA -30 326
Estonia EEA 27 1020
Hungary EEA -22 3780
Malta EEA 17 693
Latvia EEA 15 590
Lithuania EEA 7 92
Poland EEA -87 -9950
Slovenia EEA 1 1790
Slovak Republic EEA -7 1080
European Economic Area (all members) total 3020 34700
European Union (all members) total 427000 -6470
European Free Trade Association total 681 2090
Based on estimation column (2) in Table 2.
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